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Measures of psychological attributes abound in the social sciences as much as measures
of physical properties do in the physical sciences. However, there are crucial differences
between the scientific underpinning of measurement. While measurement in the physi-
cal sciences is supported by empirical evidence that demonstrates the quantitative nature
of the property assessed, measurement in the social sciences is, in large part, made
possible only by a vague, discretionary definition of measurement that places hardly any
restrictions on empirical data.Traditional psychometric analyses fail to address the require-
ments of measurement as defined more rigorously in the physical sciences.The construct
definitions do not allow for testable predictions; and content validity becomes a matter of
highly subjective judgment. In order to improve measurement of psychological attributes,
it is suggested to, first, readopt the definition of measurement in the physical sciences;
second, to devise an elaborate theory of the construct to be measured that includes the
hypothesis of a quantitative attribute; and third, to test the data for the structure implied by
the hypothesis of quantity as well as predictions derived from the theory of the construct.
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INTRODUCTION
The quantitative imperative (Michell, 1999) dominates the social
sciences,humanities,health,and related academic disciplines alike.
Accordingly, measurement pervades the non-physical sciences as
much as it does the physical sciences. But the success of mea-
surement outside the natural sciences consists largely in hiding
its Achilles heel: the lack of empirical evidence that the attrib-
utes measured are actually quantitative and, hence, measureable.
Feynman (1981), when elaborating on pseudoscience, said “social
science is an example of a science which is not a science; they
don’t do [things] scientifically, they follow the forms (. . .)[but]
they don’t get any laws, they haven’t found out anything.” Today,
more than 30 years later, the social sciences are still in a struggle
with countering Feynman’s harsh characterization of the social
sciences. The following considerations largely characterize the sit-
uation in empirical marketing research, which strongly draws on
psychological research.
Latent variables play a key role in the formulation and the test-
ing of quantitative theories that suggest causal relationships. The
proper measurement of latent variables is a pillar without which
these theories would be untestable. However, the suggestion of
a latent variable as a quantitative property is in itself a scientific
theory. The theory claims the existence of an attribute that comes
in degrees that can be measured (Michell, 1999; Borsboom et al.,
2003; Borsboom, 2005). If the attribute exists as a quantity, it is, in
principle, possible to state magnitudes of that attribute as a scalar
times a unit of measurement, which is itself a particular magnitude
of that attribute (Michell, 2004). In contrast to physical proper-
ties like length, mass, or temperature, psychological attributes are
rarely, if at all, supposed to have a natural origin. Attitude toward
a brand, for example, can vary between minus infinity and plus
infinity. We are primarily interested in differences between con-
sumers with regard to attitude, or in differences between attitudes
toward various brands. For a particular consumer, a magnitude of
attitude expresses the distance between that consumer’s attitude
and an arbitrary reference point, for example another consumer’s
attitude or the mean of a reference group. However, unless the
magnitudes are expressed in the same unit, they are not compara-
ble neither within the same consumer (when related to different
brands, for example) nor between different consumers.
MEASUREMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF VALIDITY
A scientific theory needs to make predictions that can be tested
empirically (Popper, 1996). This applies to theories relating dif-
ferent variables as much as it applies to the theory that a particular
variable exists as a quantitative attribute. However, the suggestion
of a latent variable is hardly ever framed as a theory, and no pre-
dictions are made that would indicate the quantitative character
of the attribute. Consequently, no real empirical evidence is pre-
sented as to the theory of a quantitative attribute. The measures
of the variables are used and interpreted as if they represented
magnitudes that parallel those of measurement in physics. The
problem of measurement is turned upside down inasmuch as the
measurement of an attribute implies its existence as a quantity.
Measurement of this sort is completely detached from the onto-
logical claim of a quantitative latent variable. Rather, measurement
“is defined as the assignment of numerals to objects or events
according to rules” (Stevens, 1946, p. 677). Stevens does not spec-
ify the rules explicitly but refers to permissible transformations:
“In what ways can we transform its values and still have it serve all
the functions previously fulfilled?” (p. 680).
In practice, this reasoning results in a circularity as the scale level
implies permissible transformations, which, in turn, determine
the scale level. In case of metric scales, numerals are interpreted
as numbers that “represent aspects of the empirical world” (p.
677). In the traditional paradigm of classical test theory (Lord and
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Novick, 1968), statistical analyses basically investigate the behavior
of the presumed measures. Measurability is demonstrated by the
fit to a factor analytic model and a reliability estimate beyond an
agreed-on minimum level. The idea of formative indicators does
not even require any sort of associations between item scores at all
(Salzberger and Koller, 2012). Failure to demonstrate the suitabil-
ity of a measurement instrument is almost exclusively attributed
to an inadequate instrument. The very existence of the latent vari-
able is hardly ever questioned. Others go even further and argue
that “a ‘construct’ is a definition [and a] definition can be judged
as reasonable or unreasonable but not as true or false” (Rossiter,
2011, p. 13, emphasis in the original). In other words, the category
of trueness does not apply to latent variables, and, consequently,
there is no need for empirical evidence of the actual existence of an
attribute as a quantitative property. Whether a construct definition
is reasonable or not is to be judged by experts based, at best, on
criteria of logical consistency but not based on trueness. Rossiter
(2011, p. 14) concludes that only a measurement instrument “can
be validated–in relation to the construct as defined.”
If validity is reduced to agreement among experts framed as
content validity, then one has inevitably left the realist camp. The
meaningfulness of measures that are valid only with respect to
an agreed-on construct definition is restricted to a socially con-
structed universe. The problem is that the term valid is linked to
reasonable as well as to true and real (Merriam-Webster, 2012).
From a realist point of view, the element of trueness is essential.
However, subscribing to realism but not providing empirical evi-
dence of trueness ultimately leads to the same consequences as
Rossiter’s view on validity.
Validity based on agreement leads to paradoxical consequences
when adhering to realism. There once was a time when the atom
was considered the smallest and indivisible unit of matter. In
fact, subatomic particles are a contradiction in terms given that
atom literally means it cannot be cut. This also demonstrates that
linguistic subtleties are not helpful. The terms reflect the state-of-
affairs at a particular point in time but lose the literal meaning once
the underlying theory is disproved. Today, we know that atoms are
divisible and the fact that once everyone agreed on its indivisibility
does not mean that the theory was ever right.
Rossiter (2011) views content validity as exhaustive. It is given
by the semantic correspondence between a set of items and the
conceptual definition of the construct. Any statistical modeling
of data is at best unnecessary and in the worst case misleading,
Rossiter (2011) argues. Indeed, one wonders why we actually have
to demonstrate a particular behavior of scores which are at any
rate measures by virtue of the assignment of numbers to response
options and consequently to a respondent’s level of an attribute?
The assignment of numbers is essentially an act of coding or scor-
ing manifest responses. But following Stevens (1946, 1951), coding
implies measurement. The scale level basically is a presumption
researchers agree on.
If the existence of a quantitative attribute lies at the core of
any attempt to measure a latent variable, traditional procedures
of assessing validity miss the point. Convergent validity parallels
internal consistency. It is concerned with the associations between
scores of different instruments claiming to measure the same latent
variable, while internal consistency addresses the relationships of
individual items presumably related to the same concept. Other
instruments, if available, typically lack themselves the evidence
of measuring a quantitative attribute. The same problems persist
when a proposed measure is related to antecedents and conse-
quences in a nomological network (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955).
Nomological validity relates a proposed measure to other measures
whose validity is equally questionable. The scientific laws that give
rise to the nomological network are conjectures that require val-
idation in the first place. Borsboom et al. (2009) argue that in
psychology no such laws have ever been established. Feynman’s
(1981) view still holds true.
DEFICIENCIES OF CURRENT PRACTICE
The disturbing state-of-affairs of measurement in the social sci-
ences can be illustrated by the unrealistically high success rate, the
lack of a measurement unit, the fragmentation of instruments that
purport to capture the same latent variable, and the inadequate
concept of content validity.
First of all, the success rate of asserted measurement approaches
100%. Even if one takes into account that the available evidence
of measurement is affected by a publication bias, this record is
remarkable. This is particularly astonishing given that we deal
with the most complex system known to science – humans. Latent
variables, like attitude or satisfaction, are arguably more complex
than length or temperature. And still the measurement of psy-
chological attributes does not seem to be more challenging than
measuring physical attributes. In actuality, the overwhelming suc-
cess rate of measurement in the social sciences is entirely due to
Stevens’ non-committal definition.
Second, the measurement of psychological attributes consis-
tently lacks a fundamental characteristic of measurement in the
physical sciences: a common unit. The measurement of physical
attributes has been unified, and a common metric has been estab-
lished. Length, for example, is measured using the meter as the
common (SI) unit. Measures expressed in other units can easily
be converted. In the case of psychological attributes no common
framework exists. The situation seems reminiscent on the primor-
dial measurement of length where every sovereign defined a par-
ticular unit of measurement. At present, in the social sciences there
are no real units at all. Pseudo-units are an incidental by-product of
measurement by assignment. With factor scores, the unit is defined
by the standard deviation of respondent scores. Apart from being
sample-dependent and distribution-dependent, this unit is hard
to interpret. As a consequence, researchers often resort to the aver-
age item score and rely on its interpretation with reference to the
response categories. But this approach does not allow for a char-
acterization of a particular level of the latent variable either. The
challenge is therefore not just the unification of different units but
the establishment of a proper unit in the first place.
Third, the absence of a common measuring system due to the
lack of an established measurement unit also contributes to the
fragmentation of measurement instruments and suggested attrib-
utes. Scales claiming to measure the same construct cannot be
consolidated. As a consequence, generalizations at the level of
structural theories relating different latent variables are severely
impeded. On the other hand, scales that do capture the same latent
variable may easily be taken to measure distinct latent variables.
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In the end, this indeterminacy is a consequence of measurement
being essentially data-driven and bound to a particular frame of
application rather than to a theory-driven concept definition.
Fourth, the theories of latent variables are rudimentary imped-
ing validity assessment. Scale validation strongly emphasizes con-
struct validity assessment based on convergent validity, discrim-
inant validity, and nomological validity (Borsboom et al., 2004;
Michell, 2009a). None of these validity aspects is related to the
ontological claim entailed by the (mostly implicit) theory of the
construct (see Borsboom et al., 2009). Content validity is equally
blind to the fundamental question whether a latent variable exists
as a quantity or not. Currently, suggested constructs are defined
verbally on a very general level, but elaborate theories of con-
structs are extremely rare, if they exist at all. Content validity does
not allow for theory-driven predictions under the assumption of
a quantitative attribute that are empirically testable. Designing
measurement instruments without evidence of the existence of
the attribute as a quantitative latent variable is like taking the sec-
ond step before ever having taken the first. In Michell’s (1999)
terminology, we concern ourselves with the instrumental task of
measurement, while we have not yet tackled the more fundamental
scientific task of measurement (Michell, 1997).
To sum up, proper measurement requires three ingredients that
are currently missing on the agenda of measurement: first, the defi-
nition of measurement in the physical sciences has to be readopted;
second, an elaborate theory of the construct has to be developed
that includes the hypothesis of a quantitative attribute; and third,
the empirical analysis has to test the data for the structure implied
by the hypothesis of quantity and it has to test the predictions
derived from the theory of the construct.
MILESTONES TOWARD MEASUREMENT
The fundamental prerequisite of proper measurement of psy-
chological attributes is to adopt the definition of measurement
maintained in the physical sciences so that the definition is unified
across the sciences. It appears to be the easiest step. But since it
has far-reaching consequences that cannot be dismissed as “only
philosophical”, it requires commitment and one has to expect fierce
resistance. While it is merely the acknowledgment of the scien-
tific goal of quantitative research, it overthrows more than half
a century of quantitative empirical research (see Michell, 2000).
The development of a more comprehensive theory of a quantita-
tive construct lies at the core of measurement but is a challenge
that can hardly be underestimated. Finally, a measurement model
has to be chosen that accounts for the requirements of measure-
ment. The choice is primarily determined by the consequences of
the definition of measurement. While Stevens’ definition of mea-
surement hardly places any restrictions on the properties of the
measurement model, the unified definition implies well-defined
constraints.
Measurement understood as the quantification of a latent vari-
able that actually exists as a quantitative property implies a struc-
ture in the data that ultimately follows from the axioms of quantity
(Michell, 2009b) and, specifically, the theory of simultaneous, or
additive, conjoint measurement (Luce and Tukey, 1964). Conse-
quently, a measurement model has to be sensitive to violations
of that structure. Particularly, cancelation conditions have to be
met (see Michell, 1990). The expected responses based on the
Rasch model for measurement (Rasch, 1960) have been shown
to comply with these requirements (Karabatsos, 2001). Kyngdon
(2008), though, points out that this does not necessarily imply
that the Rasch model is a practical realization of additive con-
joint measurement as a way to demonstrate additivity. From a
more pragmatic point of view, empirical fit of data to the Rasch
model at least lends credence to the successful measurement of a
quantitative latent variable. Moreover, the Rasch model requires
invariance (Andrich, 2004) as a consequence of specific objectivity
(Rasch, 1961, 1977). If invariance is empirically supported, a wide
frame of reference can be established facilitating generalization.
In contrast to traditional test theory and item response the-
ory (IRT; Embretson and Reise, 2000), which fails to comply with
cancelation conditions (see Karabatsos, 2001) and does not entail
invariance, the Rasch model is linked to the theoretical require-
ments of quantity and, thus, of measurement. Fit of data to
the Rasch model is therefore much more informative than fit to
factor analytic models or IRT. However, the Rasch model is an
intrinsically confirmatory model. It requires a solid theoretical
foundation in terms of the suggested latent variable. If such a
theoretical underpinning is missing, the application of the Rasch
model becomes an essentially exploratory undertaking. This is
particularly true if one is willing to discard a large number of
items that fail to meet the criteria of fit. Fit of the data to the
Rasch model is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion. The interpretation of measures has to be rooted in theory.
Therefore, a proper substantive theory of the construct is a sine
qua non. The theory should allow for an expected structure in the
data. At least the order of manifest items should be theory-based
allowing for a comparison of expected and observed patterns. The
ultimate goal of measurement has to be the investigation of the
causal mechanism that drives item and person measures (see Sten-
ner et al., 2009). Such a mechanism spells out what determines the
location of a particular item and allows for concrete experimen-
tal manipulations. It remains to be seen whether this will ever
be achievable in psychological measurement. But in any case the
difficulties involved must not prevent us from trying.
It is hardly possible to underestimate the implications of a par-
adigmatic shift from one definition of measurement to another,
from a plethora of descriptive measurement models to a much
more rigorous prescriptive model like the Rasch model. However,
the challenges in terms of construct theory building are probably
even harder to master. As long as substantive theories of latent vari-
ables are not advanced enough, evidence of measurement based on
the fit of data to the Rasch model should be interpreted with cau-
tion. On the other hand, science proceeds in a sequence of theory
building and theory testing. The application of the Rasch model
provides insight that can inform the theory of the construct under
scrutiny. If the property of invariance is empirically confirmed by
a series of successful replications of item measures across diverse
conditions, this can be taken as an indication of a quantitative
latent variable underlying the manifest responses.
Despite the obvious limitations of current practices of mea-
surement in the social sciences, there is, at present, hardly any
willingness to acknowledge the problem, which could not be more
fundamental to quantitative research. Concerns are pushed aside
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and regarded as purely philosophical. Indeed, there is much at
stake. Academic disciplines in the social sciences would need to
rethink a good part of their body of empirical research. There
seems to be more to lose than there is to win. But overcoming
deceptive quantification of possibly non-existing latent variables
should be viewed as an important scientific achievement in itself,
not as a loss. The prospect of properly measured latent variables
and established standards that allow for comparisons of measures
derived from different instruments should be encouraging. In
the mid-twentieth century, the adoption of Stevens’ definition of
measurement safeguarded psychology against being rejected as a
(quantitative) science (see Michell, 1999). Today, it is clear that the
social sciences had to pay a high price: measurement has become
an exercise that is completely detached from the very meaning of
scientific quantification. Specifically, the understanding of mea-
surement by assignment contradicts the self-concept of the social
sciences as empirical sciences rooted in realism. Today, the rejec-
tion of the idea of measurement by assignment and the reversion
to the unified definition of measurement in science are required
to maintain the claim of being a quantitative science.
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